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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
instrument." However, it seems that the clause in the trade acceptances
in the principal case does nothing more than give a "statement of the
transaction which gives rise to the instrument." Liability here is on the
instrument itself; the instrument needs no support from the transaction,
as in the other case, where the very maturity of the instrument depended
upon the "terms of the purchase."
In Trader's Securities Co. v. Green (Tex., 1927), 4 S. W. (2d) 182, over-
ruled in the principal case, a trade acceptance containing a clause identical
with the one found in the trade acceptance in principal case, was held to
be a negotiable instrument and the holder was held entitled to recover as a
holder in due course, under Art. 5935, Rev. Civ. Stat. Tex. 1925 (section
52, N. I. L.) to which the court made reference. The principal case seems
to stand alone in holding that a trade acceptance is not a negotiable
instrument. S. H., '30.
CONFLICT OF LAw-LAw GOVERNING THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRE-
TATION OF CONTRACTs.-The defendant railroad and another, later bankrupt,
entered into a joint contract for the purchase of coal. Their common pur-
chasing agent located at St. Louis, Missouri, sent the purchase contract,
unsigned, to the plaintiff coal company in Illinois for execution on the lat-
ter's part, and requested that the contract be returned to St. Louis "for
final handling" and execution. In Missouri joint contracts are treated as
joint and several; in Illinois the common law rule prevails. Suit was
brought against the defendant alone. Held, that the law of the place where
the contract is made governs its construction, "absent proof of a contrary
intention of the parties," and that, since a contract is made where the last
act is done towards its completion, Missouri law governs the situation, and
the defendant railroad is liable. Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & 0. R. Co.
(Mo., 1928), 8 S. W. (2d) 834.
The case is the most recent pronouncement of the Missouri Supreme
Court on the problem of what law should govern the obligations under con-
tracts made in one state, performable in another. The decision reaffirms
the position of other recent Missouri cases, treated hereinafter. There is
considerable conflict as to what law should govern contracts made in one
state to be performed in another. Three views are prominent: (1) The
view that the law of place of contracting (lex celebrationis) should govern;
(2) the view that the law of the place of performance (lex solutionis)
should govern; and (3) the view that the law of the place intended by the
parties (the autonomy doctrine) should govern.
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute
takes the first view, that is, that the law of the place of making the con-
tract should govern. The great advantage of this rule is the convenience
of application and facility with which lawyers may advise clients. The
case under consideration quotes from Sections 333 and 335 of the Restate-
ment. The former declares that a contract is made in the state where the
last act is done towards its completion. Section 335, briefly, declares that
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the law of the place of contracting determines the nature, validity, and
obligations of a contract. Missouri does not, however, accept Section 335
whole-heartedly, for the principal case qualifies it with a clause "absent
proof of a contrary intention of the parties." This may indicate that Mis-
souri is inclined toward the autonomy doctrine-that is, it may be that the
law of the place of contracting is presumed to be the one intended in the
absence of a contrary intention; but the intent, if expressed, is to govern.
However, no case expressly so declares.
An examination of the prior Missouri cases dealing with the question re-
veals that in the past the Supreme Court has shifted ground, but of recent
years more or less uniformly has followed the rule established in the
Illinois Fuel Company case. In 1910 Professor Beale of Harvard examined
the Missouri cases up to that time; his results and the Missouri citations
are collated in 23 HARV. L. REv. 196. He found that in many cases the
lex celebrationis was applied. Some cases called it the rule "ordinarily"
or "unless the parties have in view some other law." Other cases, how-
ever, adopted it as an absolute rule. Three cases even went so far as to
hold that although the parties in their agreement provided the contract
should be governed by another law, this could not be done. Cravens v.
N. Y. Life Insurance Co. (1899), 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519, Aff'd 178 U. S.
389; Horton v. Insurance Co. (1899), 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356; and Sum-
mers v. Fidelity, etc., Assn. (1900), 84 Mo. A. 605. These three cases
involve insurance policies admittedly made in Missouri, but containing pro-
visions that any disputes thereunder be referred to the law of some other
specified state. It should be noted, however, that an amendment was made
to the Missouri Insurance laws (Laws of 1895, p. 197) giving the insured
and a foreign insurance company the power to contract that the insurance
policy should be governed by the laws of some other state. This amend-
ment is a milestone marking a definite shift in Missouri's position in re-
gard to this problem. Nichols v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1903), 176
Mo. 355, 75 S. W. 664, allows New York law to govern a contract made in
Missouri. The case is identical in facts with the three cited above, and
mentions that the statute "may be regarded as repealing legislatively" the
former decisions.
Since Professor Beale's review, the Missouri decisions show a tendency to
adopt the qualified rule which savors of the autonomy doctrine as set forth
in the Illinois Fuel Co. case. In Liebing v. Insurance Co. (1918), 276 Mo.
118, 134, 207 S. W. 230, the Court said: "The question, therefore, to be
ruled is whether the loan agreement and pledge of the policy in the instant
case are governed by the laws of New York. . . Absent any contrary
intention, the validity, obligation, and interpretation of a contract relating
to personal property, are governed by the law of the place where it is made."
Fidelity Loan Securities Co. v. Moore (1919), 280 Mo. 315, 217 S. W. 286,
held that parties by their written contract concerning the purchase and
transfer of lands in Texas may lawfully agree therein that their obligations
and agreements are to be construed and governed according to the laws of
said foreign state, even though they may not at the time be domiciled there.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss2/12
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
"The intention . . is a vital part of the contract." And Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainment v. Adams (Mo., 1928), 5 S. W. (2d) 96, 98, sets out
the rule that parties may agree that their contract be governed by the laws
of a certain state or country, and that such contracts will be recognized and
enforced in other states, notwithstanding the fact that contrary rules of
law may prevail in the state asked to enforce the obligation.
In conclusion, if any prediction may be made as to Missouri's position on
what law should govern contracts made in one state, performable elsewhere,
it is that the law of the place of making will govern, unless we find an ex-
pression of a contrary intent. Missouri does not purport to adopt the
autonomy doctrine, although the results of its decisions tend in that direc-
tion. In fact, the principal case quotes from the Restatement, which de-
cidedly rejects the autonomy doctrine and rather follows the view that the
law of the place of making (lex celebrationis) should govern. But as noted
before, it ties a string to the Restatement rule, in adding "absent proof of a
contrary intention of the parties," which virtually has the effect of re-
pudiating the very rule set forth. D. A. M., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-PERMITTING
PRBSIDENT TO INCREASE OR DECREASE RATES OF DuTY.Plaintiff company
made an importation of barium dioxide which the collector of customs as-
sessed at a rate higher than that fixed by statute, the rate having been
raised by proclamation of the President issued by virtue of Sec. 315 of
Title III of the Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, 42 Stat. 858, 19 U. S. C.
154-156. Held, Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its legislative
power by imposing upon the President the duty of determining with the
aid of advisers, differences in cost of production here and abroad and mak-
ing such increases and decreases in rates of duty as were found necessary
to equalize costs of production. Hampton & Co. v. U. S. (1928), 72 L. Ed.
(Adv.) 448, 48 S. Ct. 448.
A legislative body may not delegate its powers, but may authorize an
executive officer to carry out legislation which it has adopted. The Aurora
v. U. S. (1813), 7 Cranch 382, 3 L. Ed. 378; State of Minnesota ex rel.
Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
(1888), 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782. In the latter case the court states:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the con-
ferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law."
In United States v. Grimaud (1911), 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563, 31 S.
Ct. 480 the legislative power was held not to be unconstitutionally delegated
to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Forest Reserve Acts making criminal
the violation of the rules and regulations covering forest reservations, made
and promulgated by him under authority of those statutes. In U. S. v.
Stephens (1918), 247 U. S. 504, 62 L. Ed. 1239, 38 S. Ct. 579 it was held
that the Selective Draft Act of May 18, 1917, declaring the President au-
thorized to raise an army was not a delegation of the power vested in Con-
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